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ESSAY
A TROUBLED HOUSE OF CARDS:  EXAMINING
HOW THE HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
ACT OF 2008 FAILS TO RESOLVE THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS
CHAD D. EMERSON*
I. Introduction
Since the American housing crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, Congress
has succumbed to a law-making binge aimed at mitigating the growing
problems in the real estate industry.  Unfortunately, most of these legislative
maneuvers utterly fail to address the core causes behind the housing
predicament.  The worst example of this problem is the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008—a recently-signed bill that mistakes
spending vast sums of money, while establishing new layers of federal
bureaucracy, with actually resolving the underlying issues that have provoked
this deepening crisis.1
This essay examines the origins of the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 (the HERA Act) and identifies the Act’s two most significant
failures.  In doing so, the essay provides regulatory alternatives to the failures
of the Act—solutions geared toward fixing the underlying problems that have
exacerbated what some commentators consider to be the worst American
housing crisis since the Great Depression.2
II. Origins of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
Congress passed the HERA Act on July 26, 2008, which President George
W. Bush then signed four days later on July 30, 2008.   The result of these3
actions was that, within the course of one week, one of the most misdirected
* Chad Emerson is an Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University’s Thomas
Goode Jones School of Law.  He is also the editor and founder of the Daily Sprawl blog
(dailysprawl.blogspot.com).  Professor Emerson would like to thank his research assistant,
Luther Bentley, for his assistance with this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
2. The Worst Economic and Financial Crisis in Decades:  Posting to Nouriel Roubini’s
Global EconoMonitor, http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/253378/the_worst_economic_
and_financial_crisis_in_decades (Aug. 20, 2008) (login required).
3. 122 Stat. 2654.
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
562 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:561
attempts at addressing the ongoing housing crisis was enacted into law.  To
understand the failures of the Act, one must consider how the American
housing market arrived at such an ominous point in the first place.
A. The Birth of Mortgage Debt as a Trading Tool
Under current practice, after a new mortgage is closed, that loan is often
packaged with other home loans into a device known as a mortgage-backed
security.   The security is then sold on a secondary market to an investor who4
typically receives a portion of the interest or, in some cases, the principal of
the aggregated loans.   5
At face value, this concept seems to make sense: a large group of mortgages
combined together present less risk than the purchase of a single mortgage
investment because, even if a percentage of the pooled loans fail, the
remaining ones continue to provide some value to the security.  On the other
hand, if you invest in a single loan and that loan defaults, then the entire
investment is lost.  As one commentator noted:
Institutional investors who would have stayed away from investing
in whole mortgages due to the risk of default . . . were much more
likely to purchase credit-enhanced multi-class mortgage-backed
securities that resembled corporate bonds.6
Ultimately, the key for the mortgage-backed security investor is to make
sure that the overall pool of loans is reliable enough to offset failures in
individual parts of the pool.  Significantly though, the buying, selling, and
trading of mortgages is a relatively new phenomenon.  Historically, the bank
providing the loan would keep the loan as an asset.   However, from the 1970s7
to the 1990s, the secondary market for mortgage securities exploded in
growth.   For instance, in 1984, Americans possessed $1.3 trillion worth of8
4. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (describing the mortgage-backed security
process).
5. Id.
6. Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice,
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 280 (1999).
7. Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage:  The Emergency Home Finance
Act of 1970, Standardization, and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 765, 766 (2004-2005).
8. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to
Credit Before the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Cameron L. Cowan of Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, L.L.P. on behalf of the
American Securitization Forum), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
110503cc.pdf.
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mortgage debt with 23%, or $303.6 billion of that total held as mortgage-
backed securities.   By 1998, the overall mortgage total had grown to $4.19
trillion while the percentage held as securities had expanded to $2.1 trillion,
or 52% of all mortgages.10
Driving this expansion of the secondary mortgage market were two unique
corporate entities.  In 1938, Congress established the Federal National
Mortgage Association to provide loan liquidity during the Depression Era.  11
Known more commonly as Fannie Mae, the association was originally
structured as a government entity that bought and sold federally insured
mortgages.   This allowed a secondary market to grow as potential investors12
expressed greater confidence in a federally-backed scheme.   Then, in 1968,13
Congress established the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae) to operate low income home loan programs previously controlled by
Fannie Mae.   In turn, Fannie Mae was converted into a private corporation14
that bought and sold both government insured and non-government insured
mortgages.   The unique twist was that, even though Fannie Mae was a private15
company with shareholders and its own management team, the federal
government implicitly guaranteed the loans that Fannie Mae transacted.
Apparently pleased with its creation, Congress established a similar
corporation in 1970—the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
commonly known as Freddie Mac.   The end result was an unprecedented16
situation: these two privately-held corporations operated in the private
mortgage market with implicit federal financial backing—partly justified
because both corporations continued to maintain some affordable housing
quotas within their federally-established charters.   In an attempt to define17
9. Fed. Reserve, Financial & Business Statistics, 73 FED. RES. BULL. A39 (June 1987).
10. Fed. Reserve, Financial & Business Statistics, 85 FED. RES. BULL. A35 (Aug. 1998).
11. Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723 (2006),
available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/FNMcharter406.pdf.
12. Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, TIME, July 14, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009). 
13. FundingUniverse.com, Fannie Mae, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Fannie-Mae-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
14. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723 (2006).
16. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450
(1970).
17. See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (describing a general history of the congressional acts creating and
transforming Fannie Mae); Freddie Mac, About Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com/
corporate/about_freddie.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (describing Freddie Mac).
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their unique nature, Congress elected to describe Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
as Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).18
Up until this time, the secondary mortgage market was relatively nascent. 
The slow emergence of the secondary mortgage market was no surprise
because an effective secondary market requires pooling a large number of
overall loans so that risk can be disbursed within the aggregate.  It was not
until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began buying large chunks of conventional
loans in the 1970s that such a critical mass existed.19
Rather than simply buying the loans from the issuing lender and holding
them as an investment, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac realized that they could
capitalize on their economies of scale and package these loans into a larger
security, which they could then resell to investors and realize an even larger
profit than they did from the interest on individual loans.  The importance of
this increased profit potential was especially strong since the companies (and
their management) were “owned” by private shareholders.
The growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided a powerful impetus
for an expanding secondary mortgage market.   There were willing and almost20
guaranteed buyers for many mortgage loans, a reality that incentivized banks
and other lenders prolifically to write loans that could then be sold to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.   Indeed, as one commentator noted, “[f]inancial21
institutions became increasingly willing to originate home loans when they
knew that a secondary mortgage market agency such as Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac stood ready to purchase them.”   Unfortunately, the number of22
Americans that maintain strong enough finances to qualify for a conventional
mortgage, one that requires a 10% to 20% down payment and a fixed rate
interest term, is finite.  Therefore, just as mortgage lenders were writing more
loans, they were also depleting the available pool of homebuyers who could
reasonably afford these loans.  
Two solutions existed for this problem: reduce the number of loans or
expand the pool of potential homebuyers.  For a private mortgage industry
seeking to generate profits, the best choice was obvious—increase the pool of
available borrowers.  To do this, the market would deviate from the
conventional format of fixed-rate loans that included a homebuyer down
payment to a system of new loan types that temporarily reduced the interest
rates, dramatically cut or eliminated the down payment amount or, in some
18. Rob Alford, What Are the Origins of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae?, HISTORY NEWS
NETWORK, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://hnn.us/articles/1849.html.
19. Carrozzo, supra note 7, at 800. 
20. Id.
21. Schill, supra note 6, at 280.
22. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/3
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cases, did both.  This system became known as the subprime mortgage
market.   By offering low, teaser rate loans, the lenders were able to reduce23
the mortgage’s monthly payment to a level that more homebuyers could
afford, at least during the initial phase of the teaser rate.   As Federal Reserve24
Chairman Ben Bernanke would note in May 2007, just as the subprime
mortgage market was realizing an increased number of defaults, “[t]he
expansion of subprime mortgage lending has made homeownership possible
for households that in the past might not have qualified for a mortgage and has
thereby contributed to the rise in the homeownership rate since the mid-
1990s.”25
Unfortunately, these low interest rates were not fixed, meaning that after an
initial time period, they would “adjust” to a permanent rate, one that almost
invariably would be significantly higher than the original teaser rate.   As a26
result, as the interest rate rose, so, too, did the monthly payment—a dangerous
new expense for homeowners who needed these gimmick loans in the first
place because their finances did not qualify them for conventional loans.  This
dubious method for increasing the potential pool of mortgages would be aided
by an unexpected event whose aftermath would infuse the economy with the
large amount of cheap capital needed to feed the rapidly expanding mortgage
machine.
B. The Black Swan of 9/11
In his 2007 bestselling book, epistemologist Nassim Nicholas Taleb
discusses what he calls the “Black Swan” phenomenon.   The “Black Swan”27
metaphor is based on the once held belief that all swans were white rather than
black swans, a belief that would prove inaccurate when a black swan was
discovered in seventeenth century Australia.   Taleb’s theory is that major28
societal changes are sometimes instigated by unanticipated events—the
23. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The Subprime
Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20070517a.htm (general description related to the development of the subprime
mortgage market).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Robert Kuttner, The Bubble Economy, AM. PROSPECT , Oct. 2007, at 20, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_bubble_economy.
27. NASSIM N. TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
(2007).
28. Stephanie Baker-Said, Taleb Outsells Greenspan as Black Swan Gives Worst
Turbulence, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, May 2008, at 38, available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=aHfkhe8.C._8.
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discovery of a black swan—that, until then, were not considered to be within
the realm of possibility.29
Under Taleb’s thesis, society often does not recognize the triggering event
for significant changes until after the event has occurred.   This is often30
because the event itself would not have seemed predictive of the major
change.   In the context of the subprime mortgage market, the tragic events31
of September 11, 2001, represented a leading “Black Swan” trigger for the
current housing crisis.  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks fulfilled this role because, in their immediate
aftermath, a battered U.S. financial system prompted the United States Federal
Reserve (the Fed) to dramatically lower its main lending rate, eventually
reducing it to 1%, among the lowest rates ever offered by the Fed.   The32
Federal Reserve took this step to stimulate economic activity by making the
cost of borrowing money extremely low.   The idea was that, even with its33
confidence shaken by brazen terrorist attacks, the U.S. economy would be
unable to resist such historically cheap money.   Such a response would, in34
turn, lead to increased lending and spending, activities that had driven
domestic financial growth through the previous two decades.35
As one commentator Daniel Gross summarized the situation:
After the recession came in 2001, followed by the attacks of 9/11,
Congress and the White House jacked up spending and cut taxes
massively, and Alan Greenspan sought to blow air into a slack
economy by slashing interest rates furiously and keeping them
low—which has proved a huge boost to the vast housing-related
complex. Cheap and easy money begat higher home prices, which
further boosted the demand for cheap and easy money, which begat
higher home prices yet again.  Meanwhile, falling interest rates
allowed people to turn their homes into ATMs through mortgage
refinancings.36
29. TALEB, supra note 27, at Introduction.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Martin Crutsinger, Greenspan, Other Fed Officials Sought to Restore Confidence
Following 2001 Terrorist Attacks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 15, 2007, available at  http://www.
blnz.com/news/2007/05/15/Federal_Reserve_details_post-9/11_effort_9-11.html.
33. See Daniel Gross, Bubble over Troubled Waters, SLATE, June 28, 2005, http://www.
slate.com/id/2121684.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/3
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Though Daniel Gross would correctly recognize that the Federal Reserve’s
interest rate cuts would spur higher home prices, his conclusion that this
strategy would benefit the U.S. economy wildly missed the mark.   Indeed,37
the Federal Reserve’s plan to keep America churning through the availability
of cheap money actually worked too well.  The low interest rates not only
navigated the economy through the post-9/11 challenges but also provoked
such prolific lending that it would transform itself from the solution to the
problem.
By 2003, the financial markets had become so flush with money that the
traditional market for mortgages would prove insufficient compared to all of
the available money.   This further whetted the lenders’ appetite for riskier38
subprime mortgages and increased their already large pool of potential
applicants.  All seemed well for several years post-9/11 as home values
increased, and the large doses of cheap money stoked credit spending by
consumers and businesses.
By October 2005, though, problems began to emerge.  Wall Street analyst
Meredith Whitney made news by predicting that the subprime housing
situation was a crisis-in-waiting.   Her prediction was generally regarded as39
one of the first major warnings that the mortgage house of cards was about to
crumble.   As it turned out, the accuracy of this prediction would soon prove40
true.
C. The Failure to Learn From the LTCM Debacle
In the mid 1990s, the federal government’s response to a similar financial
crisis unwittingly encouraged the financial markets (including the housing
concerns) to continue these risky lending strategies while hedging those risks
on the possibility that, if things got too bad, the federal government would
provide a safety valve.   The previous crisis was the failure of the Long-Term41
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund.   Following the 1997 Asian42
Financial Crisis and the 1998 Russian Government Debt Default, the highly
37. Id.
38. Fred W. Frailey, 15 Things You Need to Know About the Panic of 2008, KIPLINGER,
Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/09/how_the_financial_crisis_
started.html.
39. Jon Birger, Whitney: Credit Crunch Far from Over, FORTUNE, Aug. 5, 2008, http://
money.cnn.com/2008/08/04/news/newsmakers/whitney_oppenheimer.fortune/.
40. Id.
41. See Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It’s a Short-Term Memory, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2008, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.
html?_r=1.
42. Id.
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leveraged LTCM found itself unable to meet all of its financial obligations.  43
However, rather than allow the hedge fund to fail—primarily because it feared
the intertwined consequences that might result from such a large failure—the
Federal Reserve organized a $3.6 billion bailout package that allowed the fund
to meet its obligations.   While this staved off the fund’s immediate death,44
LTCM would eventually close down in 2000.45
The LTCM bailout raised the concern that the Federal Reserve’s
intervention would implicitly promote the risky type of highly leveraged
strategies embraced by LTCM because other large funds and companies could
also expect the federal government to bail them out.   In other words, though46
no express guarantees would be made, companies with extensive and
intertwined investment portfolios would reasonably believe that, in the event
of catastrophic losses, the government would save them to avert a perceived
larger risk to the system.
Indeed, even while denying that the LTCM intervention constituted a
bailout, Alan Greenspan, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
acknowledged this very risk in testimony before Congress:
Of course, any time that there is public involvement that softens the
blow of private-sector losses--even as obliquely as in this episode--
the issue of moral hazard arises.  Any action by the government
that prevents some of the negative consequences to the private
sector of the mistakes it makes raises the threshold of risks market
participants will presumably subsequently choose to take.  Over
time, economic efficiency will be impaired as some uneconomic
investments are undertaken under the implicit assumption that
possible losses may be borne by the government.47
The government’s intervention in LTCM’s failure would seem to have done
exactly what was feared—provide a financial backstop for the riskiest forms
of financial behavior.   Indeed, by 2008, this reality was lent further credence48
as the federal government stepped in to orchestrate massive bailout programs
43. BRUCE I. JACOBS & KENNETH N. LEVY, MARKET NEUTRAL STRATEGIES 159 (2005).
44. Lowenstein, supra note 41.
45. JACOBS & LEVY, supra note 43, at 162.
46. Tyler Cowen, Was an Old Bailout a Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at
BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/economy/28view.html?_r=2&
ref=todayspaper.
47. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large
Hedge Fund, Long-term Capital Management: Testimony Before the Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 1998), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/TESTIMONY/1998/19981001.htm.
48. Lowenstein, supra note 41.
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for the investment bank Bear Stearns and multi-national insurance giant AIG.  49
Even before 2008, however, the U.S. housing industry was engaged in equally
risky investment strategies that would ultimately and brilliantly fail beginning
in the summer of 2007.
D. The Breaking Point of 2007
Every house of cards eventually has a breaking point at which the entire
structure collapses even though only a single new card is added.  For the
housing industry (and many would argue the financial industry as a whole),
this pivotal time occurred in mid-2007.
One of the first indices of the housing meltdown occurred in April 2007
when the country’s largest subprime lender, New Century Financial,
capitulated to collateral calls that resulted from increasing mortgage defaults
and filed bankruptcy.   By August 2007, the mortgage problems extended50
beyond the subprime market as American Home Mortgage, a company that
generally operated above the subprime market, filed bankruptcy.   Later that51
month, the growing defaults in mortgages, both prime and subprime, would
force Countrywide Mortgage, the nation’s largest mortgage issuer when
measured by dollar amounts, to seek $11.5 billion worth of emergency
financing.   It would also drive large subprime lender AmeriQuest into52
bankruptcy.53
Once again, as it had done following 9/11, the Federal Reserve (and
numerous other central banks) attempted to stave off fiscal disaster by
injecting “cheap money” back into the financial markets.   This time,54
however, the gambit failed to work; there was by then simply too much bad
49. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/17insure.html?scp=1&
sq=FED%20IN%20AN%20%2485%20BILLION%20RESCUE%20OF%20AN%20INSUR
ER%20NEAR%20FAILURE&st=cse.
50. Adam B. Ashcraft, Measuring the Impact of Securitization on Imputed Bank Output
at 6 (Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at  http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/
AEAStat/papers/Ashcraft_and_Steindel_1-2008.pdf.
51. American Home Mortgage Files for Bankruptcy, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2007, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-08-06-american-home-mortgage-
bankruptcy_N.htm.
52. Neil Irwin & Tomoeh M. Tse, Wall St. Buckles, Bounces Back, WASH. POST, Aug. 17,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/16/
AR2007081600773_pf.html.
53. Posting of Matt Padilla to http://mortgage.freedomblogging.com/2007/08/31/ameri
quest-to-shut-down (Aug. 31, 2007, 18:54 PST).
54. Nils Pratley, Markets in Trouble? Throw Money at the Problem. Lots of It, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 11, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/
2007/aug/11/usnews.useconomy2.
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debt from failing mortgage-backed securities.  Though the Federal Reserve
and Treasury Department would devise a host of responses well into 2008, by
that summer the crisis continued to grow as the government resorted to
guaranteeing the bad debt of a failing Bear Stearns.   With options running55
low, Congress decided to step in and open the federal coffers in an attempt to
stop the mortgage failures that seemed intent on breaking the financial markets
that invested in them.  As credit tightened, Congress acted.  Unfortunately, it
elected for a fundamentally flawed response.
E. Congress’ Fundamentally Flawed Response
Once upon a time, Americans often celebrated a mortgage payoff with a
ritual burning of the mortgage papers, an act so symbolic that iconic television
families such as the Waltons and the Bunkers centered whole episodes on this
type of celebration.   Yet, today, rather than burning them, many Americans56
are getting burned by their mortgages.  For instance, in the 1980s, the equity
in the homes of Americans reached approximately 70% of the home’s value.  57
However, with the increasing popularity of second mortgages (marketed more
palatably as “home equity loans”) and low or no down payment loans, the
percentage had dropped to less than 50%, the first time that level has been
reached since World War II.58
By May 2008, the foreclosure crisis had also expanded to prime mortgages
with the two key measures of mortgage delinquencies almost doubling over
the prior year.   The failure of these traditionally reliable loans further59
entrenched a cycle where increased foreclosures led to banks tightening
lending standards which, in turn, reduced the available pool of loans and
55. Jim Zarroli, Morning Edition: Bernanke Defends Fed’s Rescue of Bear Stearns (Nat’l
Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=89369942.
56. See TV.com, All in the Family: “Mike Makes His Move,” http://www.tv.com/all-in-the-
family/mike-makes-his-move/episode/38216/summary.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (Bunker
Family mortgage-burning party); TV.com, The Waltons: “The Celebration,” http://www.tv.com/
the-waltons/the-celebration/episode/59429/summary.html?tag=ep_list;ep_ title;14 (last visited
Oct 12, 2008) (Walton party).
57. Louise Story, Home Equity Frenzy Was a Bank Ad Come True, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/business/15sell.html?page
wanted=2&_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=business&adxnnlx=1219154453-HaN14pYFYoGkd
13YdJTkew.
58. Id.
59. Les Christie, The Next Wave of Mortgage Defaults, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 16, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/12/real_estate/prime_defaults_price_drops/index.htm?ref=pa
trick.net. 
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stunted sales.  The consequence of these stunted sales was an even greater
decline in home values.   60
In July 2008, Congress responded to this reversal of fortunes by passing the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.   While many economists trace61
the actual housing crisis to 2007, the true origins of the problem—and, for that
matter, the HERA Act itself—go back much further.  Indeed, the housing
crisis can be traced to the popularization of the idea that the “American
Dream” was centered on home ownership—a premise that sounded noble but
ultimately proved disastrous in actual practice.
Promoting home ownership is a flawed strategy if accomplishing that goal
requires providing unconventional loans to individuals who could not
otherwise qualify for conventional ones.  Doing so ignores the reality that
loans are only as useful and valuable as the borrower’s ability to repay them. 
Instead of devising unconventional means for writing loans, the logical route
would have been to encourage borrowers to delay their home purchase until
they had the means for entering into a conventional loan—that is, a loan with
a fixed rate and down payment that they could reasonably expect to avoid
defaulting on.  
This is not to say that emergencies in life sometimes do not create
unexpectedly difficult financial challenges.  In the present crisis, however, the
massive number of loans in default is not the result of medical emergencies or
other personal crises.  Rather, these loans are overwhelmingly the result of
unconventional loans whose terms, once adjusted from their initial rates,
overwhelmed the borrower’s budget.  62
The fact that default rates are significantly tied to the effects of the new
rates on adjusting mortgages leads to a significant point:  American society
unreasonably maintains a strong bias against renting one’s dwelling while
saving toward a conventional home purchase.  If this bias did not exist, then
policymakers might devise a strategy that would promote quality and
affordable rental housing that at the very least would allow potential
homebuyers to establish the down payment and credit needed to obtain a stable
mortgage based on personally-affordable terms.  Unfortunately, Congress
simply reinforced this bias against rental housing through the provisions of the
HERA Act.
60. Id.
61. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
62. Patrick Bajari, Sean Chu & Minjung Park, Quantifying the Triggers of Subprime
Mortgage Defaults, VOXEU.ORG, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2937.
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F. The Major Provisions of the HERA Act
The HERA Act itself is divided into three general subparts.   The first63
governs “housing finance reform” and the second and third address
“foreclosure prevention” and housing tax-related issues.   64
The first subpart on housing reform focuses primarily on improving the
supervision over the GSEs, both in their financial standing and their progress
toward accomplishing their unique missions.   This subpart also creates a new65
regulatory body, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and outlines the
authority that the nascent agency will have over Federal Home Loan Banks
like the GSEs.   In addition, this first subpart includes the HOPE for66
Homeowners Program, a somewhat curious location for this provision since
it would logically seem to fall within the “foreclosure prevention” umbrella of
the second subpart.   67
The second major part of the HERA Act related to foreclosure prevention
includes as its centerpiece the FHA Modernization Act of 2008.   Operating68
under the goal of “Building American Homeownership,”  this program69
revamps FHA lending practices related to: a) down payments; b) conforming
loan types; and c) mortgage counseling matters.   This part also includes new70
programs and reforms related to veterans’ housing,  service member71
housing,  mortgage disclosure matters,  and block grants covering72 73
“emergency assistance for the redevelopment of abandoned and foreclosed
homes.”74
The third and final section of the HERA Act regulates multi-family, single
family, and real estate investment trust tax matters, and it includes increased
tax deductions and a form of tax credit “loan” for certain homebuyers.75
While the HERA Act itself is filled with a wide variety of matters, several
provisions represent the most significant aspects of the legislation.  These
63. 122 Stat. 2654-2913.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 2661-62. 
66. See id. at 2661-64.
67. Id. at 2800.
68. Id. at 2830.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2836.
71. Id. at 2858.
72. Id. at 2848.
73. Id. at 2855.
74. Id. at 2850.
75. Id. at 2877.
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include: the HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, the Foreclosure Prevention
Act of 2008, and the restructuring of GSEs and their lending practices.
1. HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008
The HOPE for Homeowners Act is a voluntary program whereby Congress
provides $300 billion to the Federal Housing Authority (the FHA) to put
toward modifying defaulted loans into fixed-rate, thirty-year mortgages.  76
Under this “sub-act,”  lenders must first agree to reduce the unpaid principal77
balance to 90% of the home’s current value—essentially a write-off equating
to ten cents on the dollar for the defaulted loan.   If the lender agrees to this78
modification, then the FHA will insure the new loan against default.   Other79
key provisions include limiting the program to only first-time homeowner-
occupants,  requiring that the homeowners’ mortgage debt exceeds 31% of the80
homeowners’ income,  requiring that homeowners certify under penalty of81
perjury that they have not intentionally defaulted on their mortgage,  and82
mandating that lenders document and verify the borrower’s actual income via
IRS records.   The program is scheduled to sunset on September 30, 2011.  83 84
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) anticipates that 400,000 homeowners
(and their lenders) will utilize the program.   Funding for the program will85
primarily come from a new Affordable Housing Trust Fund that will be funded
by regular contributions from the GSEs.86
2. Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008
The HERA Act also establishes a multifaceted program whose potluck of
mini-programs is intended to stave off foreclosure and neighborhood blight.  87
It seeks to accomplish this by “modernizing” the FHA.  Examples of this
modernization include raising the FHA loan limit from 95% of the area median
76. Id. at 2802.
77. Within the HERA Act, Congress dubbed several provisions as “Acts” themselves.  I
refer to these provisions as “sub-acts” to clarify this confusing nomenclature that Congress
created.
78. 122 Stat. 2801.
79. Id. at 2800.
80. Id. at 2803.
81. Id. at 2801.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2803.
84. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.hud.gov/news/recoveryactfaq.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter HERA FAQs].
85. 122 Stat. 2803.
86. Id. at 2712.
87. Id.
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home price to 110%—with this number capped at 150% of the GSE loan
limit.   In addition, the Act requires FHA loan recipients to provide down88
payments of at least 3.5%  and undergo even more extensive pre-loan89
counseling than the FHA currently requires.90
Another component of this sub-act provides local communities with nearly
$4 billion worth of additional Community Development Block Grants.  91
These grants are earmarked for redeveloping, rehabilitating, and even
purchasing foreclosed homes in an attempt to prevent the crime and blight
sometimes associated with neighborhoods with foreclosed homes.   This92
portion of the HERA Act also establishes a revamped loan assistance program
for military veterans.   93
3. Restructuring of GSE Regulations and Lending Practices
The HERA Act also mandates that the GSEs expand the number of loans
in low income areas and increase the loan limits in areas that have high costs
of living.   These efforts, aimed at promoting affordable housing, are94
supplemented by the Affordable Housing Trust Fund whose proceeds are
designated for the development of affordable rental housing.95
While the HERA Act contains many more provisions loosely tied to
housing and foreclosures, the above provisions represent the most significant
(and publicized) portions of the Act.  Indeed, they are the components that
Congress apparently believes will rescue the residential housing market from
the foreclosure malaise.  As set forth in the following sections, a closer
examination of the Act reveals that this belief is founded neither in fact nor
sound practice.  Indeed, once exposed to close scrutiny, the HERA Act is
likely to wilt through ineffectiveness.
III. Positive Effects of the HERA Act
While the HERA Act is fundamentally flawed in several important ways,
it includes several provisions that may have a limited positive effect on the
residential mortgage market.  Ironically, this positive result is likely
unintentional.
88. Id. at 2830-31.
89. Id. at 2831.
90. Id. at 2836.
91. Id. at 2850.
92. Id. at 2851.
93. Id. at 2858.
94. Id. at 2853.
95. Id. at 2712.
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In particular, the HERA Act overhauls much of the home loan program
administered by the FHA.  This was done with the goal of saving homeowners
from foreclosure by providing a mechanism for restructuring troubled variable
interest loans into fixed-rate mortgages.   The Act authorizes the FHA to back96
$300 billion worth of these revamped loans.   In doing so, it also provides97
several new underwriting requirements:
! The new loan cannot exceed 90% of the appraised value for the
property.98
! The new loan shall maintain a fixed-rate of interest and shall not be for
a term less than thirty years.99
! Second liens are prohibited on the new loan for five years.100
! Mortgagee income must be documented and verified through IRS income
tax filings.101
! Down payment assistance is essentially eliminated.102
The combined effect of these provisions is that they severely limit the ability
of lenders to offer riskier loans such as subprime, Alternative-A, payment
option ARM, and other loans where the buyer has little to no equity
investment in the purchase.  This is a positive step since these are the very
types of loans that are driving the foreclosure crisis because they were the
loans of last resort for individuals who could not qualify for or afford
conventional mortgages.
By culling these unconventional loans from the FHA program, fewer people
will qualify for home loans, and those who do will likely qualify for smaller
loans.  In other words, the HERA Act establishes a more logical nexus
between the borrower’s financial situation and the cost of the loan.
The reality is that lender participation in the program is voluntary;
theoretically, the program could go unused if lenders decide the financial
sacrifices are too onerous—for instance, participation will require a lender to
waive many delinquency-related fees and penalties.   103
In addition, the problematic idea of having the federal government actually
participate in the private mortgage loan market remains unaddressed as
96. HERA FAQs, supra note 84.
97. 122 Stat. 2712.
98. Id. at 2801.
99. Id. at 2802.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2803.
102. Id. at 2831.
103. Id.
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apparently too dramatic an option for a politically-motivated body like
Congress to carefully consider.  Nevertheless, the HERA Act does lay the
groundwork for limiting federally-backed unconventional mortgage products. 
Unfortunately, many of the Act’s other provisions offset these benefits to the
point of turning the Act into an incredibly ineffective response to the housing
foreclosure crisis.  The following sections examine the especially misguided
provisions of the Act.
IV. The First Major Failure: Poorly-Defined Loan Modification and
Foreclosure Provisions
Though the HERA Act was signed by President Bush in late July 2008,104
the FHA loan modification portion of the legislation was not scheduled to
begin until October 1, 2008.   This delay was designed to give the FHA time105
to coordinate the vast new administrative responsibilities related to
coordinating hundreds of thousands of loan modifications with lenders and
homeowners.  Even before the President’s signing, however, HUD officials
had warned that the program’s vast and complex nature would likely delay its
implementation until as late as mid-2009.   While this position was said to106
have “ticked off” Representative Barney Frank, one of the bill’s leading
congressional proponents,  such a timeframe should hardly have been107
surprising.  Indeed, the idea that a federal agency could establish a new
federally-backed loan modification system unlike any program that the
government had previously developed, and that it could do so in roughly two
months, strained credulity.  This is especially true since that program is replete
with many instances of unstructured requirements and vague instructions.  The
following section examines the significant instances where the HERA Act’s
loan modification provisions prove ill-conceived.
A. The Intentional Default Provision
The HOPE for Homeowners portion of the HERA Act empowers the FHA
to facilitate the modification of existing variable rate loans into fixed rate
104. David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Sweeping Housing Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/business/31housing.html?partner=
rssnyt.
105. 122 Stat. at 2807.
106. Stacy Kaper, HUD: Foreclosure Program Will Not Be Ready by October, AM. BANKER,
July 28, 2008, available at http://americanbanker.com/article.html?id=200807250C5X6HK6
(login required).
107. Paul Jackson, As Housing Act Passes Congress, Questions Emerge,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM, July 26, 2008, http://www.housingwire.com/2008/07/26/as-housing-act-
passes-questions-emerge/.
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versions.   While the program is voluntary for lenders, if they do participate,108
the FHA will back the modified loans.   Several practical problems exist with109
this plan though.  For instance, lenders must agree to waive fees related to
delinquency.   They must also write down the loan value to 90% of the110
overall amount.   In addition, the first mortgage holder must negotiate with111
secondary mortgage holders (including home equity loan owners) to
extinguish those secondary loans.   However, the bill does not provide any112
incentive for those secondary lien holders to agree to waive their rights;
meaning that without the secondary mortgage holders unlikely participation,
the loan modification cannot occur. 
These types of provisions clearly undermine the likelihood of lender
participation.  However, even if the lender opts to join the program, several
other provisions must be met before a borrower is eligible.
One of those provisions—requiring that the borrower cannot have
intentionally defaulted on a loan—seems logical on the surface.  After all,
borrowers who agreed to disadvantageous loan terms, but who can still afford
those terms, should not be able to purposefully default in order to obtain better
terms.  As reasonable as this sounds, the provision is still fraught with trouble.
In particular, how will the government determine whether a default was
intentional or simply the result of bad financial decisions by the borrower? 
While obvious schemes to purposefully default on a loan could be discovered
through empirical research, such as a decision not to pay one’s mortgage even
though an individual continues to possess the financial means to do so, poor
stewardship and wasteful spending by the consumer is much harder to
quantify.  Would a borrower who just purchased a new car that now forces
them into mortgage default fall within the intentional provision, or would they
simply be chalked up as a lousy money manager?  
The resources and time required to determine whether a default is
intentional or merely the result of negligent spending would likely make the
program unworkable beyond a limited scale as it would necessitate scouring
a borrower’s financial habits and decision-making.  Considering that the
purpose of the program is to resolve the large number of defaulted mortgages,
this creates an inherent conflict: the program only works on a small scale, but
it is intended to work on a much larger one.  
108. 122 Stat. at 2802.
109. HERA FAQs, supra note 84.
110. 122 Stat. at 2801.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Ultimately, the HERA Act nobly endeavors to keep fraudulent defaults out
of the loan modification program.  Unfortunately, the mechanism for doing so
is too vague and subjective. 
B. The Minimum Down Payment Provision
The Foreclosure Prevention section of the HERA Act usefully eliminates
seller down payment assistance programs.  Under these programs, a home
builder could contribute money to a non-profit association which would then
turn around and provide the home buyer with down payment assistance
funds.   This essentially allows buyers to purchase a home without putting113
any of their own money down—a problematic approach since it enables those
without even the slightest liquidity for a down payment to qualify for a home
loan.
Though such an approach does open the door to home purchasing for more
individuals, it does so for a population segment that—because of its lack of
liquidity—is not well-suited for financial challenges such as a job losses,
medical emergencies, and upward adjustments on a variable mortgage rate. 
This creates the untenable situation of providing a mortgage to buyers who
apparently lack sufficient reserve savings to provide for such contingencies. 
Both the FHA and the IRS previously opposed down payment assistance
programs as prone to loan defaults or even fraud.   This is hardly surprising114
according to respected economist William R. Emmons: 
One indicator of increasing risk is greater borrower leverage. About
45 percent of subprime borrowers in 2001 had less than 20 percent
equity in their houses at the time they took out the mortgage. Five
years later, 58 percent were in this category, an increase of 13
percentage points.115
The HERA Act’s elimination of this practice serves as one of its highlights. 
Unfortunately, rather than mandating that home buyers invest in a significant
down payment in order to qualify for an FHA loan, the Act only requires a
minimum 3.5% down payment as opposed to more historically-common 10%
113. Paul Jackson, Housing Bill Adds Second Lien Amendment; DAPs to Be Eliminated,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM, July 23, 2008, http://www.housingwire.com/2008/07/23/housing-bill-adds-
second-lien-amendment-daps-to-be-eliminated/.
114. Posting of Devona Wells to the News Tribune, http://blogs.thenewstribune.com/real
estate/2008/08/01/down_payment_assistance_killed_by_mortga (Aug. 1, 2008, 12:49 PST).
115. William R. Emmons, The Mortgage Crisis: Let Markets Work, but Compensate the
Truly Needy, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, July 2008, at 10, 12, available at http://www.stls.frb.org/
publications/re/2008/c/pages/mortgage.html.
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to 20% down payment amounts.   This opens the door to individuals who are116
likely not well-positioned to be purchasing a home until they have amassed
additional savings.117
C. Conforming Loan Limits that Remain Too High
One effect of the housing crisis has been a dramatic reduction in home
prices; in some cases, home prices have fallen over 20% off their peak.   This118
reduction represents the private market correcting itself.  One effect of this
correction is that lowered home prices means homes become more affordable. 
Despite this reduction in price, the HERA Act empowers the FHA to increase
its loan amount to 150% of the present cap for the GSEs.   Currently, that119
number stands at $625,000,  which presents an obvious question:  why is the120
federal government backing loans this large?
After all, if the justification for federal participation in the private housing
market is centered on the goal of subsidizing affordable housing, $600,000
loans would hardly seem to fit within that scope.  Even in high cost housing
markets, that amount represents an expensive number, especially when one
considers that those very markets (such as California) are realizing some of the
highest price decreases.121
Worse still, insuring such high loans ultimately exposes the U.S. taxpayer
to large losses in an overheated housing market where, as evidenced by the
current crisis, the value of the home drops well below the loan value—a prime
indicator of default potential.   Rather than reign in maximum loan amounts122
116. Kenneth R. Harney, 20% Down Seems like Ancient History, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007,
at K3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/11/realestate/re-harney11.
117. Emmons, supra note 115, at 12 (“When house prices stop rising or actually fall, the
sale-or-refinancing escape hatch begins to close.  Any financial setback can translate quickly
into mortgage delinquency and, sometimes, into default.”).
118. Martin Feldstein, The Problem Is Still Falling House Prices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008,
at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122307486906203821.html?mod=google
news_wsj.
119. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2008-36, 2009 FHA
MAXIMUM MORTGAGE LIMITS (2008), available at http://www.fand.com/PDF/HUD%20ML%
202008-36.pdf.
120. U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Summary of the “Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008,” http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/Housingand
EconomicRecoveryActSummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Senate Summary
of HERA].
121. Sharon L. Lynch, Metro U.S. Home Prices Fall on Higher Foreclosures (Update 2),
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601213&sid=aAa
W9UAEs8Dk&refer=home.
122. See, e.g., John Gittelsohn, WaMu Loaned Millions to California Home Flippers
Convicted in Fraud Scheme, Sept. 22, 2008, at E1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.
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for the GSEs and the FHA, the HERA Act expanded the limits and,
quixotically, suggested that doing so promoted affordable housing.   This123
illogical justification bears witness to the problem with federal involvement
in the home loan market, namely that it cannot reasonably delineate between
small amounts of mortgage assistance to lower income buyers and large loans
for middle and upper income buyers who otherwise would be unlikely to
qualify for higher priced homes.  While aiding lower income borrowers to
obtain basic housing may warrant some government intervention, a federal
role in backing individuals above a low income classification does not advance
any reasonable affordable housing policy.
In order to avert future mortgage crises, the HERA Act should have, at
most, limited home loan assistance to basic and safe housing for lower income
borrowers who possess a reliable means for paying the loan.  The decision to
increase loan amounts without placing a hard cap on the amount of those loans
exposes the federal government, and therefore the taxpayer, to more open-
ended liabilities. 
V. The Second Major Failure: HERA Maintains the GSE’s Flawed
Corporate Structures
As early as 1999, the New York Times somewhat prophetically predicted the
folly of permitting the GSEs involvement in the subprime mortgage market: 
In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie
Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any
difficulties during flush economic times. But the government-
subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic
downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the
savings and loan industry in the 1980’s.124
These words of caution followed the GSEs insistence that they should expand
mortgage availability to “borrowers whose credit is just a notch below what
our underwriting has required.”   Such a ridiculous notion of watering down125
objective loan requirements to expand the loan pool clearly indicated that both
the GSE’s leadership and their government regulators had cast aside sound
com/html/businesstechnology/2008194436_wamu220.html.
123. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2201, 122 Stat.
2654, 2848.
124. Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1999, at C2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE7D
B153EF933A0575AC0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print.
125. Id. (quoting Franklin D. Raines, Fannie Mae’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
at time of article).
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business principles in their rush to extend home ownership to unqualified
borrowers, while simultaneously attempting to maximize the mortgage-backed
security profits for their private shareholders.
The fact that commentators noted this nearly a decade in advance indicates
that the existing GSE regulations were failing.  Yet, rather than revisit the
efficacy of these regulations, the HERA Act opts for creating a new regulator
apparently to govern such illogical behavior.  In particular, the Act purports
to establish a new “world class” regulator for the GSEs.   126
This situation lends itself to two important questions.  First, it implies that
the existing regulatory combination of HUD and the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) is something less than “world class,” which,
in turn, begs the obvious question: why?  What about the current regulatory
scheme falls short of reaching “world class” regulator status?  Indeed, one
could reasonably argue that it is the existing regulations—rather than the
regulators themselves—that represent the core of this problem.  More
importantly, why has Congress neglected to restructure the entire regulatory
framework for the GSEs as opposed to simply establishing yet another federal
agency?  
Unfortunately, the HERA Act provides little useful guidance in answering
these questions.  Instead it seems to merely adopt the approach that, if a crisis
strikes, the best response is to shift the problem to a new agency to address the
problem.  By doing so, it neglects the underlying problem that the GSEs
operate under inherently flawed corporate structures.  In the end, it does not
matter how “world class” a regulator may be if the regulations to be
administered are decidedly third world.  The HERA Act’s failure to remedy
this represents a major failure and missed opportunity.
A. Restructure the GSEs as Either a Private Entity or a Government
Concern
In 2002, the Wall Street Journal made what turned out to be an astute
prediction:
The point all of this makes, and the point we’ve been trying to
make all along, is that Fan and Fred don’t function like other
companies. The two biggest mortgage holders in the country are
allowed to pile up debt, implicitly guaranteed by taxpayers, without
being held to even the minimum of corporate governance standards
that every other publicly traded company has to observe. Sooner or
later this is asking for trouble.127
126. Senate Summary of HERA, supra note 120.
127. Editorial, Inside Fannie, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at A22, available at http://online.
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Six years later, the companies were no longer just asking for trouble but,
instead, had become so compromised that the United States Treasury was
forced to place them under conservatorship in order to preserve their
existence.   It was within the HERA Act itself that Congress provided the128
Treasury with authority for such an unprecedented action.   Treasury129
Secretary Henry Paulson’s suggestion that merely providing his department
with the authority would likely be sufficient to ward off the companies’
collapse  proved wrong.  Instead, the credit crisis forced the Treasury130
essentially to take over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and, in so doing,
expressly established the federal government as guarantor for their failing loan
portfolios.  
A major failure in the HERA Act is that this authority granted to the
Treasury did not require the government to precisely define the GSEs as either
private corporations or public agencies.  Rather, it allowed them to remain in
the hybrid form while their profits were realized by the private market, yet
their risks were backed by the public coffers.  The net effect is that the GSEs
are even more directly tied to the public monies trough but are then allowed
to run up large lobbying bills at taxpayer expense.   Richard Syron, Freddie131
Mac’s CEO during much of the subprime loan boom, acknowledged that the
company’s current corporate structure creates an inherent problem:  “This
company has to answer to shareholders, to our regulator and to Congress, and
those groups often demand completely contradictory things.”   An August132
2008 New York Times article demonstrated the challenge:
[T]he companies were constantly under pressure to buy riskier
mortgages. Once, a high-ranking Democrat telephoned executives
and screamed at them to purchase more loans from low-income
borrowers, according to a Congressional source.  Shareholders
wsj.com/article/SB1016494105312486320.html?mod=Extra.
128. See MARK JICKLING, GOV’T & FIN. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP (2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paulson’s Itchy Finger, on the Trigger of a Bazooka, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/business/09sorkin.
html?ref=business.
131. Lindsay Renick Meyer, Update: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Invest in Lawmakers,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2008/09/update-fannie-
mae-and-freddie.html.
132. Charles Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Discarded Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/05freddie.html?_
r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print.
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attacked the executives for missing profitable opportunities by
being too cautious.133
If Congress was interested in resolving the underlying problem, it too
should have recognized the competing forces that vie for the GSEs fiscal
attention.  In doing so, Congress could have federalized the GSEs and operated
them as a national housing entity.  Or it could have fundamentally revamped
the charters for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae by explicitly privatizing their
operations.  While both approaches present challenges, either one would have
eliminated the inherent conflicts faced by having to financially perform for
private shareholders while being forced to comply with business goals
established by the public government.  
Significantly, a full privatization of the GSEs would not require Congress
to reject a federal role in affordable housing.  Instead, it would simply restrict
the government’s ability to back risky loans to unqualified borrowers under the
guise of a private market participant.  Instead of the ambiguous GSE model,
Congress could utilize a variety of legislative tools, such as tax incentives and
regulatory reform, to promote safe and affordable housing.  
Unfortunately, Congress appeared obsessively predisposed against the very
reasonable proposition that rental housing can constitute safe and affordable
housing.  Thus, leaving the GSEs essentially in their suspended state of
public/private limbo will leave them as a competitor in the private mortgage
market, empowered to transact riskier loans than the rest of the private market
because of the GSE’s federal backing.
B. In the Alternative, Prohibit the GSEs From Transacting Unconventional
Loans
The HERA Act also empowers the FHA to purchase billions of dollars’
worth of mortgages and convert them into new loans with fixed rates and
lower monthly payments.   While this might seem like a compassionate thing134
to do—after all, no reasonable person would celebrate another’s default—the
provisions’ lack of precision fails to delineate between fraudulently established
loans and those that simply resulted from an overstretched borrower meeting
an overeager lender.
The problem of this “reform” is really quite simple:  the GSE’s will still be
permitted to generate private profits while shifting the risks to the federal
government and, by extension, the American taxpayers.  Under the HERA Act,
this fundamental flaw remains unresolved because, in the end, the Act does not
expressly prohibit the GSEs from purchasing so-called “Liar Loans”—those
133. Id.
134. Senate Summary of HERA, supra note 120.
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loans where the purchaser is not required to provide proof of their income,
debts, or other indices of financial soundness.   This represents a terrible135
omission when one considers that liar loan defaults alone may reach $100
billion dollars.  136
If Congress is insistent upon retaining the GSE’s hybrid structure, at the
very least it should limit the damage enabled through such a scheme by
limiting the GSEs’ portfolio to only conventional mortgage loans. 
Unfortunately, the HERA Act fails to accomplish even that.
VII. Conclusion
From the perspective of maximizing long-run economic efficiency,
it would be better to allow housing and mortgage markets to sort
themselves out, as painful as that may be.137
It is easy to act like a Monday morning quarterback while sitting on the
sidelines outside the glaring lights of a crisis.  Something that seems so
obvious from that vantage point might not be so clear from within the tempest
of the problem.  However, even allowing for that, the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, though borne out of crisis times, simply fails to address
the underlying issues that provoked the continuing housing and credit
challenges facing this country.  Instead of a comprehensive solution, the
HERA Act dangles a disparate collection of piecemeal responses.
Not surprisingly, the ultimate result is the misdirected spending of money
and promulgation of laws that, at best, might temporarily provide a narrow
swath of relief.  This haphazard approach is not the cadence of problem-
solvers committed to placing sound economic theory before political
machinations.  It is for this very reason that the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 will not solve the vexing predicament it seeks to
address.  As a result, the crisis continues.
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